BANK OF RUSSIA LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT OF THE BANKING SECTOR: OBSERVATIONS BASED ON THE PAST THREE YEARS EXPERIENCE V.Morgunov
The Bank of Russia upgraded its framework of interest rate instruments of the monetary policy in September 2013.
1 When managing liquidity in the banking sector, the Bank of Russia seeks to make sure that overnight money market interest rates are close to the key rate. This opera onal objec ve can be achieved though employing monetary policy instruments and a set of rules and opera onal procedures, which is called the framework of symmetrical interest rate corridor. Not only does the interest rate corridor framework aim to keep fl uctua ons of market interest rates within limits, but it is also designed to drive them towards the middle of the interest rate corridor, that is, the key rate.
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The Bank of Russia considers auc on-based 1-week repo opera ons as the principal instrument designed to regulate liquidity in the banking sector amid structural defi cit of liquidity. When se ng a limit on such opera ons, the Bank of Russia relies on forecast liquidity forma on factors in the banking sector, "in an eff ort to meet credit ins tu ons' needs for resources that enable them to meet the reserve requirements and to carry out payment opera ons". 3 The Bank of Russia publishes its liquidity factors forecast for the ensuing week and a one-week repo auc on limit on the date of auc onbased repo opera ons (on Tuesday).
The Bank of Russia relies on its published method of se ng limits for aucon-based repo opera ons. 4 Should the Bank of Russia have correct assessment of the banking sector's liquidity demand, credit ins tu ons' demand for standing facili es are rela vely small. Also, note that in this case credit ins tu ons do not have to seek a specifi c type of standing facili es (e.g., standing lending facili es) more frequently than the other (e.g., standing Source: The Bank of Russia.
Fig. 1. Credit ins tu ons' debt to the Bank of Russia on repo opera ons and on loans secured by non-marketable assets and guarantees in July 2011 -July 2016
deposit facili es). This derives from the fact that within the framework of symmetrical interest rate corridor central bank open market opera ons provide the banking sector with liquidity equal to the mathema cal expecta on of structural defi cit of liquidity in this sector, while credit ins tu ons compensate for random liquidity shocks and for errors in liquidity forecasts 1 by seeking standing facili es.
Liquidity management in the banking sector is more complicated because the Bank of Russia has other liquidity provision instruments in addi on to auc on-based repo opera ons; in par cular, there is such a signifi cant channel of liquidity provision as loans secured by non-marketable assets and guarantees. Figure 1 gives some insight into compara ve volumes of banks' debt on repo opera ons (auc on-based, and fi xed-rate, opera ons) and of loans secured by assets and guarantees.
Consider the fi nal "rising de" for loans secured by non-marketable assets and the current downward period. In the period between 31 July 2013 and 15 January 2015, the debt on loans secured by non-marketable assets and guarantees was on the rise, there were some devia ons though, and it was on the slide a er 15 January 2015. What was the eff ect of upward and subsequently downward dynamics of loans secured by non-marketable assets on Bank of Russia principal opera ons of banking sector refi nancing, that is, auc on-based repo opera ons? To correctly forecast liquidity forma on factors and to set a limit on auc on-based repo opera ons, the Bank of Russia should consider in its forecast the dynamics of the second component of liquidity provision to the banking sector, that is, loans secured by non-marketable assets and guarantees. How successful was the coordina on of limit on auc on-based repo with an cipated dynamics of loans secured by nonmarketable assets? The ques on can be broadened because there are specialized instruments of refi nancing and other types of credit opera ons: how successful was the conformity of the volume of auc on-based repo operaons with the dynamics of the por olio of other refi nancing instruments?
Analyse the results of Bank of Russia auc on-based repo opera ons during the two periods that we specify.
Two hundred and thirty seven (237) various-term auc on-based repos were held during the "upward trend period" between 31 July 2013 and 15 January 2015, including 72 one-week repo auc ons, 155 auc ons for a term of 1-3 days and nine auc ons for a term of 15, 21, 90 days and 12 months. The auc on results show that the auc on limit was not reached, the actual vo lume was less than the limit in 133 cases (56% of the auc ons). The forecast overstated the demand for liquidity at repo auc ons, there were instances of above-normal limits.
Take for example the one-week repo auc on results. In 2014, the volume was below the limit in 19 cases, it was below the limit by more than Rb 100bn at 10 auc ons, and it was below the limit by more than Rb 500bn in three cases. Also, note that credit ins tu ons o en used more expensive standing lending facili es in big volumes on dates following the auc ons where the limit was not reached. For example, on 25 March 2014, the volume at a oneweek repo auc on was below the limit by Rb 663bn due to weak bidding. At the same me, on that day and on consecu ve days of the week credit ins tu ons borrowed daily Rb 400bn or more through FX swap opera ons (FX swaps) with the Bank of Russia.
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Things changed markedly during the period of downward trend for debt on loans secured by non-marketable assets. For instance, 88 repo auc ons were held in the period between 16 January 2015 and 2 August 2016, most of which were 7-day repo auc ons. The limit was not reached in only nine cases (10% of all the auc ons). The demand was far above the set limit at many auc ons during the same period, and the cut-off rate was markedly above the minimum bid rate (key rate), according to the auc on results. No wonder that on the dates following the date of one-week repo auc on credit ins tu ons sought for (more expensive) Bank of Russia standing facili es to enhance liquidity. Table 1 presents data on 10 auc ons to illustrate this trend in one-week repo auc ons during the specifi ed period. Table 1 
ONE WEEK REPO AUCTION RESULTS AND DEBT ON STANDING LENDING FACILITIES
These observa ons allow one to conclude that the forecast of liquidity forma on factors in the banking sector that underlies Bank of Russia limits on one-week repo auc ons is imperfect and its accuracy depends, among other things, on the quality of forecast changes in credit ins tu ons' debt on loans secured by non-marketable assets and guarantees. The above menoned Bank of Russia's document "On se ng limits on Bank of Russia open market liquidity provision (absorp on) opera ons" says nothing about harmoniza on of volumes of credit ins tu on refi nancing via various channels. The ques on remains open, although the results of regular auc on-based opera ons of credi ng against non-marketable assets for 3-month term at a fl oa ng interest rate are known on the date of se ng the limit on one-week repo auc ons. Addi onally, there are non-regular auc on-based opera ons and standing facili es whose results should be considered or foreseen, in par cular because early repayment on them is possible, to achieve success in managing liquidity in the banking sector using principal auc on-based repo opera ons and in maintaining the money market interest rate close to the key interest rate.
Descrip ve sta s cs of money market overnight interest rate (MIACR) fl uctua ons are presented in Table 2 . The market interest rate was above the Excluding the period of high turbulence in the mid-December 2014 and the period when there was a clear "smell" of upcoming structural surplus of liquidity (see the bo om line in Table 2 ), the interbank lending market interest rate was above the key rate by an average of 0.34 p.p.s. The money market interest rate was below the key rate during the fi nal period, although it was clear that the interest rate on unsecured interbank loans should stay above the rate on Bank of Russia secured loans by a factor of credit risk premium. Observers by themselves should consider whether the Bank of Russia's interest rate policy is successful, because the Bank has not specifi ed the extent to which the money market interest rate is to be considered appropriately close to the key rate.
New problems of managing the money market interest rate are to emerge as a structural surplus of liquidity in the banking sector gets close. The market interest rate will ini ally be below the key rate, and then it is expected to near the lower bound of the interest rate corridor. The Bank of Russia will manage the short-term money market interest rate with an accuracy up to 1 p.p.
